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Your Licensor Has a License to Kill, and It May
Be Yours: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Resist
Bankruptcy Law That Threatens Intellectual
Property Licensing Rights
Jon Minearl
"[The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of
1989] is intended to restore confidence in the system of in-
tellectual property licensing, and courts interpreting it
should be sensitive to the reasonable practices that have
and will evolve among parties seeking to add to the techno-
logical and creative wealth of America.' ',
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine, for a moment, that you are the founder and CEO of a
small technology company, Squirtech. After several years of putting
together the management, facilities, capital, and licensing rights, you
have developed a wildly popular product that is rapidly making your firm
the industry leader. Although your true passion lies with the technical
and creative aspects of your company, you are beginning to assemble a
management team so that your company is well positioned to go public.
In the past, you have employed outside legal counsel to solve specific
problems on a case-by-case basis. Let's face it, you do not encounter
I J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, May 2008; B.A., Political Science, Emory Uni-
versity, 2003. First and foremost, I am grateful to Professor Rafael I. Pardo, Michael G. Wickstead,
and Grant F. Hopper for their constructive criticism of this Comment. Without their suggestions and
support none of this would have been possible. All opinions and errors are my own. Thanks also to
the tireless efforts of Ryan Carson and the Seattle University Law Review staff. Finally, I would like
to dedicate this work to my wife, Kristina, for her love and unfailing patience.
1. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 9 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.
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enough problems to necessitate in-house counsel, nor are you sophisti-
cated enough to put such expertise to good use.
Shortly before the winter holidays, you learn that one of the com-
panies from whom you license technology, Titanic Technologies, has
gone into bankruptcy. Back when you were still developing your own
product, you contacted this company because you had the good sense to
recognize a way to use intellectual property ("IP") owned by Titanic in a
profitable, new way. Moreover, you had the foresight to secure a licens-
ing agreement for a substantial length of time. You remember vividly
the care you took to finalize all the legal arrangements. It's too bad Ti-
tanic management was unable to keep the ship afloat. Shortly thereafter,
you receive notice that Titanic is selling all of its assets and closing its
doors. "No matter," you surmise, "I'll just continue to work with who-
ever purchases the intellectual property. But just to be on the safe side,
I'll find a bankruptcy attorney after I get back into the office in January."
Too bad for you. A little over three weeks later, while still seeking
counsel to review the notice, you have yet to object to the bankruptcy
sale. Moreover, you did not realize that this sale was, in fact, a sale ex-
tinguishing any and all existing interests in Titanic's IP, including your
licensing agreement. When a bankruptcy attorney finally assesses your
situation, she must break the bad news: You have lost your rights under
the licensing agreement to use that IP, despite the fact that you paid a
substantial amount for a binding agreement lasting another fifteen years.
Then you realize something truly devastating: Your wildly successful
new product uses and depends on that IP, so you must halt production
immediately. Because of the nature of the manufacturing design, you
cannot engineer around the use of this licensed technology. Furthermore,
because your competitor purchased the technology at the bankruptcy sale
(for a fire-sale price), there is little chance you can negotiate a new deal.
Your competitor probably profits more from putting you out of business
than by selling or licensing the IP back to you or anyone else. Your busi-
ness may not be ruined, but you are certainly in store for a rough New
Year.2
2. This narrative is not based on real events. Instead, this is a "worst case" scenario and is, of
course, subject to some exceptions. For example, a licensee can sometimes obtain rights to use
similar IP and adapt his or her business model at little cost. While it may be possible to continue
operating a business with relatively little interruption, the loss of IP is usually quite damaging to an
enterprise because, as a unique property right, IP is difficult to replace.
Furthermore, I am by no means the first author to illustrate the risk of losing one's right to use
licensed IP during bankruptcy by placing the reader in the shoes of a licensee. Cf Robert Tamietti,
Technology Licenses Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Licensee"s Mine Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J.
295, 295 (1988). Whereas Mr. Tamietti's article predates the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Pro-
tection Act ("IPBPA") and addresses the risk to a licensee that the licensor may reject the licensing
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This hypothetical situation may not be a common occurrence, yet
the result is entirely possible in certain parts of the country. In recent
opinions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
interpreted the Bankruptcy Code3 ("the Code") in a manner that makes
inaction or ignorance perilous for IP licensees whose licensor declares
bankruptcy. Although Congress amended the Code to protect a licensee
from losing technology rights in these situations, 4 the Seventh Circuit has
narrowly interpreted5 a strikingly similar bankruptcy provision involving
real-estate leases 6 and, in doing so, has cast doubt on the efficacy of the
licensee protections found in section 365(n) of the Code. In addition, this
circuit has broadly interpreted another Code section dealing with title-
clearing sales of a debtor's property, giving wider effect to section
363(f) . Such a sale strips all existing interests and conveys a debtor's
property "free and clear" at auction.8 Thus, by checking protective meas-
ures and amplifying economic risks, the federal judiciary has seriously
threatened the survival of many companies. 9 Unfortunately, this legal
equivalent of a one-two punch can knock out even the heavyweights of
the business community.
Two factors leave businesses particularly vulnerable to the loss of
IP licenses. First, nearly all companies use IP.10 In fact, dependence on
IP pervades the entire economy--conventional merchants and technol-
agreement, this Comment explores the risk that the licensor does not reject the license before selling
it free and clear.
3. Throughout this Comment, all abbreviated Code sections and references to "the Code"
should be understood as referring to Title 11 of the United States Code.
4. See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the history and details of the IPBPA.
5. See Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, L.L.C. (In re Qualitech Steel Corp. &
Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp.), 327 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2003). See discussion infra Part
III.C.2.
6. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 139 (2006) ("The specific rules gov-
erning technology licenses in § 365(n) are analogous to the specific rules governing real property in
§ 365(h)."); Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Section 363 Sales Free and Clear of Interests: Why the
Seventh Circuit Erred in Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel, 59 Bus. LAW. 475, 499 (2004) ("As
a result of the substantial similarity between § 365(h) and § 365(n), the case can be applied easily in
§ 363(0 sales to extinguish the rights of licensees of intellectual property under § 365(n)."); Christo-
pher C. Genovese, Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel: Easing the Tension Between Sections 363
and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 627, 647-48 (2004) ("Similar to
section 365(h), the language of section 365(n) does not explicitly refer to situations in which the
debtor sells its assets (including intellectual property that it licenses) pursuant to section 363(0.").
7. See FutureSource L.L.C. v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2002). See discussion
infra Part III.C.1.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (2006).
9. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
10. See Alberto Torres, Unlocking the Value of Intellectual Assets, MCKINSEY Q., 1999 No. 4,
at 36.
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ogy businesses alike."1 Second, IP used by a company can be one of its
"most valuable assets., 1 2  Specifically, technology licenses generate
substantial revenue 3 and "often form the cornerstone of a licensee's
business or operations."'
' 4
While a business may escape severe repercussions following the
sudden loss of licensing rights, the "consequences can be devastating,
perhaps leading to the licensee's own bankruptcy."' 5 In this economic
environment, the legal system must be attuned to the significant risks
facing all companies.' 6 The threat to the technology sector is especially
grave because these companies rely more heavily on licensing rights. 7
Although only the Seventh Circuit has interpreted the Code in this
fashion, other circuits may soon follow. Because U.S. technology com-
panies "have taken hold most strongly in [metropolitan areas] in the
West, ' 18 predominantly in the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction, this circuit is
11. See Teresa L. Johnson & Bryce R. Giddens, The Treatment of Intellectual Property Li-
censes in Bankruptcy and Secured Transactions, 831 PRACTICING L. INST. PATENTS COPYRIGHTS
TRADEMARK & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 447, 455 (2005).
12. NICK VIZY, CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY LAW § 18:1 (2007).
13. Torres, supra note 10, at 31 ("[I]ntellectual assets can represent a powerful stream of reve-
nue. Many leaders in the pharmaceuticals industry generate a substantial part of their sales by mar-
keting products licensed from other companies."); see ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, I LICENSING AND
THE ART OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT § 12:8 (2006) (explaining the primacy of licensing trans-
actions to the "new economy" companies); Roger G. Schwartz & Shelley C. Chapman, Does One
Size Fit All?: As E-Commerce Businesses Falter, the Flexibility and Reach of the Bankruptcy Code
is Challenged to Meet Varied Needs, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 12, 2001, at B9 (noting that assets owned by
Intemet and e-commerce businesses consist "almost entirely of intellectual property, such as tech-
nology licenses and agreements"); Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11 ("There are few, if any, busi-
nesses today whose operations do not depend on intellectual property licenses, whether as licensors
or licensees.").
14. Richard M. Cieri & M. Natasha Labovitz, License Rights: New Threats to Bankruptcy
Protections for IP Licensees, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 2003, at 5.
15. VIZY, supra note 12, § 18:10.
16. See Lori E. Lesser, Bankruptcy and Licensing, 764 PRACTICING L. INST. PATENTS
COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARK & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 571, 575 (2003).
17. See Stuart P. Meyer, Exploiting Intellectual Property Assets Through Licensing: Strategic
Considerations, 468 PRACTICING L. INST. PATENTS COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARK & LITERARY PROP.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 29, 33 (1996) ("Virtually all high technology companies rely on licenses
to achieve their business goals."); see also GOLDSCHEIDER, supra note 13 (explaining the primacy of
licensing transactions to the "new economy" companies); Schwartz & Chapman, supra note 13
(noting that assets owned by "new economy" businesses consist "almost entirely of intellectual
property, such as technology licenses and agreements").
18. ROBERT D. ATKINSON & PAUL D. GOTTLIEB, THE METROPOLITAN NEW ECONOMY INDEX
1 (2001), available at http://www.neweconomyindex.org/metro/summary.htm. The high-tech sec-
tor, of course, is dominated by companies in California and Silicon Valley, in particular. Id. at 5,
available at http://www.neweconomyindex.org/metro/part5_page5.html (noting that Silicon Valley
"remains the technological innovation capital of the globe, with a strong presence in a host of high-
tech sectors, including biotech, Internet, telecom, computers, and devices"); Christopher Palmeri,
The Future of California, BUS. WK., April 30, 2001, at 110 (explaining that Silicon Valley is a lead-
ing center of the technology industry). In fact, California has more than twice the number of high-
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uniquely positioned to consider Congress's true intent-that courts foster
success in the technology industry by issuing rulings that do not care-
lessly stifle technological growth or terminate successful business ven-
tures.19
For the foregoing reasons, the Ninth Circuit should resist the rea-
soning of its sister circuit. Instead, as the circuit whose jurisdiction en-
compasses the lion's share of the "new economy, ' 20 the Ninth Circuit
should broadly read IP licensee protections and suppress hazards lurking
in sales "free and clear." More precisely, it should continue to make sec-
tion 363(f) title-clearing sales subject to section 365(n) protections and
require affirmative consent of licensees before extinguishing valuable
technology licenses in a title-clearing sale.
Part II of this Comment explores the underpinnings of IP and bank-
ruptcy law. Part III discusses a pair of recent opinions by the Seventh
Circuit that lay the foundation for examining licensee protections in
bankruptcy. In Part IV, this Comment provides reasons why courts
should resist the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit. Moreover, a possible
solution for IP licensees facing "free and clear" bankruptcy sales is pre-
sented. Finally, Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit, in particular,
must break with its sister circuit by effectuating Congress's intent to pro-
tect and honor the rights of licensees.
tech workers as second-ranked Texas. Compare American Electronics Association, Texas's Tech
Industry Adds 10,300 Jobs, http://www.aeanet.org/PressRoom/prjjcs2007_texas.asp (last visited
July 31, 2007) (noting a total of 445,800 high-tech workers in Texas in 2005), with American Elec-
tronics Association, California's Tech Industry Rebounds, Adding 14,400 Jobs,
http://www.aeanet.org/PressRoomprjjcs2007_califomiaba.asp (last visited July 31, 2007) (noting
that an astonishing 919,300 Californians worked in high technology in 2005).
19. See infra Part V. Not all business headquartered in the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit,
however, will necessarily file for bankruptcy there. Many companies based in, for example, Califor-
nia are incorporated in New York or Delaware and may choose to file in the state of incorporation.
Interview with Michael G. Wickstead, Member, Ogden Murphy Wallace, P.L.L.C., in Seattle, Wash.
(Feb. 16, 2007); see BAIRD, supra note 6, at 24 ("Proper venue for filing a bankruptcy petition in-
cludes state of incorporation, and because many large businesses are incorporated under or have an
affiliate incorporated under Delaware or New York law, large bankruptcy cases are often filed
there."). But see David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 522 (1994) (arguing that the internal affairs doctrine would not
force a bankruptcy court to apply the bankruptcy law of the federal appellate circuit wherein the
business is incorporated).
20. See GOLDSCHEIDER, supra note 13 (defining "new economy" companies as those which are
technology-based).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. U.S. Intellectual Property Law
1. Overview
The law of intellectual property delineates the "property rights of
owners of intangible assets. 21 These assets include, among other things,
trademarks, patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and publicity rights. 2
Many well-known products, computer program source code for exam-
ple,23 consist primarily of intellectual assets. Moreover, growth in many
new industries, such as biotechnology, is driven in part by the expansion
of intellectual property law.24 Unlike real property, the use of which is
limited by its tangible nature, intangible assets are indivisible; that is, an
infinite number of individuals may use the same "information without
depleting it."'25 The ability to license IP to many separate individuals or
companies multiplies the potential use, and thus economic value, of the
IP. 26  For example, over forty-five companies have licensed the same
scientific "technique developed for making proteins in bacteria.
' 27
Intellectual assets are primarily conveyed either by assignment or
license.28 While assigning an information asset transfers most of its
21. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 4 (2d ed. 2004).
22. See id. at 1-5.
23. H. WARD CLASSEN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE To SOFTWARE LICENSING FOR LICENSEES AND
LICENSORS 5 (2005).
24. Craig J. Madson, Patents, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR FRANCHISE, BUSINESS, AND IP COUNSEL 237, 241-42 (William A Finkelstein & James
R. Sims III eds., 2005). Madson writes passionately about the scientific advances made possible by
the evolution of IP jurisprudence:
[Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980),] broad new classes of patentable subject matter, including human genes, animal
and plant genes, novel nucleotide and oligonucleotide molecules, transgenic animals,
transgenic plants, and gene therapies, have been subjects of patent applications. Patents
granted from such applications have helped to render research and development into
many biotechnology applications profitable, thus supporting research, and the growth of
new industries is bound to bring about bold changes in the future of mankind. Entire in-
dustries have been built around the hope of commercializing the data derived from the
Human Genome Project and other genetic research.
Id.
25. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 18 (5th ed. 2004).
26. See id
27. Andrew Pollack, It's Alive! Meet One of Biotech 's Zombies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, at
31.
28. CLASSEN, supra note 23.
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property rights, much like a "sale, '29 some IP owners choose instead to
license the use of their IP to others in exchange for a fee or royalties.3a
Typical licensing agreements, however, restrict a licensee's use to either
a "specific application or geographic market."'
Demands of the market often dictate the use of licensing agree-
ments over full assignments of IP.3 2 Technology company managers who
intend to both develop and market IP "run[] the risk of not realizing its
full value. 3 This is true because the two activities require different spe-
cialized skills: "Many large companies are much more proficient at
commercializing their products than at developing them. 3 4 In fact, ex-
change markets have sprung up where technology developers can license
their intellectual assets to other companies.3 5 Research and development
departments need not abandon unusable IP; rather, the company can li-
cense these assets and turn a profit.3 6 In all, IP licensing activities form a
37significant part of the U.S. economy.
2. Bankruptcy Law Narrows the
Intellectual Property Field
While the term "intellectual property" properly describes various
types of assets, the Bankruptcy Code defines the term narrowly to in-
clude only trade secrets, patents, patent applications, plant varieties,
copyrights, and mask works.3a Such a definition captures, for example,
29. See id. Property rights in the intellectual asset not transferred by assignment "include, for
example, the rights of performance or preparation of derivative works rights." Id. Another type of
licensing agreement, the "exclusive license," is more akin in character to a sale than a license. Id.
Note, however, that "for copyrights, non-exclusive licenses prevail over a purchaser so long as the
license is evidenced in a signed writing and was either made before the ownership transfer or was
taken in good faith and without notice before the transfer recorded." Gary H. Moore, Buying and
Licensing Intellectual Property from Troubled Companies, 779 PRACTICING L. INST. PATENTS
COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARK & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 303, 340 n.55 (2004)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (2006)).
30. Meyer, supra note 17, at 41 ("License revenue is typically sought either through up-front
license fees or through periodic fees, or both. The term 'royalty' is commonly used to refer to
periodic fees that are due and payable upon dispensing a product or service including the licensed
technology.").
31. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 4 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3202.
32. See Meyer, supra note 17, at 41 ("Revenue is generally the prime motivator for most licen-
sors. Typically, a licensor has expended a great deal of time and money to develop a valuable tech-
nology and a license is a common tool by which the licensor can exploit the value in that technol-
ogy.").
33. Torres, supra note 10, at 30.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id. at 30.
36. See id. at 34.
37. Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11, at 461.
38. See I l U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006). According to statute,
(2) [a] "mask work" is a series of related images, however fixed or encoded-
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computer software code,39 but excludes trademarks, trade names, service
marks,40 rights of publicity, unpatented inventions that are not trade se-
crets, and contingent licenses. 4 ' Notably, Congress excluded trade-
marks,42 one of the three central forms of intellectual property law along-
side copyrights and patents.43 Although legislative history indicates that
trademarks were intentionally excluded because of quality control issues
unique to this form of IP, 44 their omission may have simply been a prod-
uct of political horse trading.45 Because the Code defines "intellectual
property" narrowly, the scope of this Comment will encompass only
those particular intellectual assets covered therein.
B. U.S. Bankruptcy Law
1. The Framework: Navigating the Code
Bankruptcy law supports twin public policy concerns: Giving the
honest debtor a fresh start and instituting an orderly debt collection pro-
cedure to satisfy the claims of creditors when insufficient assets exist for
repayment in full. 46 These concerns apply with equal force to industries
built on IP, even though the technology industry is risky by nature.47
Bankruptcy proceedings are governed by federal law organized un-
der Title 11 of the United States Code.48 Congress set forth a system of
bankruptcy procedures and divided them by chapter.49  The form of
bankruptcy entered "depends on the goals of the person filing the peti-
(A) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimensional pattern of metallic, insu-
lating, or semiconductor material present or removed from the layers of a semiconductor
chip product; and
(B) in which series the relation of the images to one another is that each image has the
pattern of the surface of one form of the semiconductor chip product.
17 U.S.C. § 901 (2006).
39. CLASSEN, supra note 23, at 77.
40. THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 4:1, at 344 (rev. ed. 2005).
41. Lesser, supra note 16, at 590-91.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006).
43. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 21, at 1.
44. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
45. WARD, supra note 40, § 4:1, at 343-44 (explaining that "[t]he definition is artificially con-
structed to serve the legislative purpose of allowing some, but not all, nonbankrupt licensees to re-
tain rights that might otherwise be rejected as executory by bankrupt licensors"). Some scholars
advocate that trademarks should take their rightful place as IP entitled to this bankruptcy protection.
See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1267, 1270 (2004).
46. E.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 2-3 (1993).
47. Jens Wostemann, Evaluation and Response to Risk in International Accounting and Audit
Systems: Framework and German Experiences, 29 J. CORP. L. 449, 458 (2004).
48. E.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 3-4.
49. E.g., id. at 4; BAIRD, supra note 6, at 6.
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tion." 50  The early chapters--Chapters 1, 3, and 5-form the general
rules governing all routes through bankruptcy,5' while the "remaining
chapters set out different procedures for distinct kinds of bankruptcy
cases."
52
Generally speaking, bankruptcy law acts to pay off creditors either
by (1) liquidating a debtor's assets or (2) rehabilitating a debtor's ability
to earn profits in the future.53 The first type of bankruptcy involves the
liquidation of assets under Chapter 7. In such cases, a federal official,
the U.S. Trustee,54 appoints a trustee55 to administer the process for the
debtor,56 be it an individual person or a corporation. 7 The Chapter 7
process is relatively straightforward for debtors who are individuals: 58
"[T]he trustee collects the nonexempt property of the debtor, converts
that property to cash, and distributes the cash to the creditors." 59 Once
this is completed, a debtor receives a discharge "releas[ing] . . . the
debtor from any further personal liability for his or her pre-bankruptcy
debts. 6 ° With discharge in hand, the individual is off to a fresh start,61
albeit with fewer belongings. Corporations, on the other hand, do not
receive a discharge62 and are not entitled to a fresh start.63 In the case of a
corporation, "[t]he purpose of... Chapter 7 petitions is not to give credi-
tors assets but to assure creditors that the corporation has no assets.,
64
The second type of bankruptcy operates to restructure the debtor's
finances.65 Chapters 11, 12, and 1366 each function in this way, and a
50. BAIRD, supra note 6, at 18.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); see BAIRD, supra note 6, at 6.
52. BAIRD, supra note 6, at 6.
53. EPSTEIN ETAL.,supra note 46, at 8.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. Because the form of the bankruptcy proceeding matters little in regards to the substan-
tive issues addressed in this Comment, the term "trustee" will be used to indicate any bankruptcy
"actors"-both trustees and debtors in possession-who are charged with administering a debtor's
bankruptcy.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2006) ("The term 'debtor' means person or municipality concerning
which a case under this title has been commenced.").
57. E.g., BAIRD, supra note 6, at 9. Throughout this Comment, an "individual" may refer to
either a natural person or a corporate entity.
58. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 9.
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 11; BAIRD, supra note 6, at 18 ("Section 727 gives the honest but unfortunate debtor
a discharge. Because future income of an individual does not become property of the estate under §
541, the effect of § 727 is to give the individual debtor the right to enjoy future income free of credi-
tors' claims.").
61. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 6; BAIRD, supra note 6, at 1.
62. BAIRD, supra note 6, at 19.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 8; see WARD, supra note 40, § 4:1, at 342.
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
debtor's circumstances will determine which form of bankruptcy is
available.68 The Chapter 11 process is "designed for the restructuring of
business organizations." 69 Instead of calling on a trustee to liquidate the
debtor's assets, as is the case in Chapter 7, the procedures of Chapter 11
ordinarily allow a debtor in possession 70 to continue to operate his or her
business.
71
Business owners and managers will generally prefer to reorganize
rather than liquidate a company.72 Whereas an individual debtor gener-
ally seeks a fresh start free of personal liability, corporate owners are by
nature shielded from personal liability. 73 Free of such risk, they are gen-
erally motivated to reorganize under Chapter 11 by personal incentives to
both keep their jobs74 and maintain control over the bankrupt business.
75
2. Licensing Agreements are Executory Contracts
Bankruptcy is a complex process with detailed rules neatly cover-
ing most situations. Importantly, a bankruptcy trustee has the power to
"use, sell, or lease ... property" on behalf of the debtor.76  Such expan-
sive power authorizes a trustee to maximize the value of the estate, re-
gardless of whether the debtor is in liquidation or rehabilitation proceed-
ings, in keeping with bankruptcy's function as an orderly "debt collec-
tion system.
',77
When a debtor enters bankruptcy with unfinished contractual obli-
gations, bankruptcy law authorizes the "trustee, subject to the court's
approval, [to] assume or reject any executory contract . . . of the
66. "Chapter 12 ...deals with the rehabilitation of family farmers and family fishermen.
Chapter 13 deals with the rehabilitation of individuals with regular incomes." WARD, supra note 40,
§ 4:1, at 342. As such, these chapters are beyond the scope of this Comment.
67. See id.
68. BAIRD, supra note 6, at 8.
69. Id. at 21; WARD, supra note 40, § 4:1, at 342.
70. See BAIRD, supra note 6, at 13 ("[U]nder § 1107 the debtor in possession takes on the
duties and responsibilities of the trustee. Code provisions authorizing the trustee to take certain
actions apply with equal force to the debtor in possession. In the case of a corporation, the old man-
agers of the debtor corporation act as debtor in possession."); EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 7.
71. EPSTEIN ETAL.,supra note 46, at 13.
72. BAIRD, supra note 6, at 19 ("In many cases, a corporation finds itself in Chapter 7 only
after first having tried unsuccessfully to reorganize under Chapter I .").
73. E.g., ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 276 (2006)
(noting that, generally, "shareholders are not liable for corporate debts").
74. MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY § 9.01 (1995).
75. BAIRD, supra note 6, at 20 ("Those in control of the corporation outside of bankruptcy
usually want to retain that control in bankruptcy. Chapter II allows the retention of control, while
Chapter 7 requires the appointment of a trustee to manage the affairs of the business.").
76. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006); see also BAIRD, supra note 6, at 14.
77. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 2.
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debtor. ' '78  Although the Code fails to define an "executory contract,"
most, but not all, courts follow Professor Countryman's definition: 79 "a
contract under which the obligation of both the [debtor] and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other."
80
In the IP context, legal scholars generally consider IP licenses to be
executory contracts, 81 and the Ninth Circuit has adopted that view as
well. 82 So universal is this judgment that "[t]here are no reported deci-
sions holding that an intellectual property license is not an executory
contract."83 These agreements are considered executory because parties
on both sides generally have "material ongoing obligations [of] quality
control, use of notice and legends, duty to defend and enforce IP rights,
duty not to sue each other, [and] exclusivity obligations. 84
Trustees have an obligation to "'assume' advantageous executory
contracts and 'reject' burdensome ones. '85  To "assume" means to
"bind[] the bankruptcy estate to the debtor's prepetition performance ob-
ligation under the terms of the contract assumed. 86 To "reject," how-
ever, means that "the [bankruptcy] estate ... is not and never was bound
by the contractual obligations of the debtor." 87  Such a decision, of
78. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
79. E.g., BAIRD, supra note 6, at 129; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 231.
80. Ven Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy. Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973).
81. See, e.g., In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (not-
ing that nonexclusive copyright and patent licenses are executory contracts); VIZY, supra note 12,
§ 18:7; Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11, at 458; Stuart M. Riback, Intellectual Property Licenses:
The Impact of Bankruptcy, 845 PRACTICING L. INST. PATENTS COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARK &
LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 755, 761 (2005); Philip S. Warden & Kenneth A
MacKay, Drafting Technology Licenses in a Down Market, 801 PRACTICING L. INST. PATENTS
COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARK & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 299, 304 (2004); see
also Tap Pub'ns, Inc. v. Chinese Yellow Pages (N.Y.) Inc., 925 F. Supp. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting that trademark licenses are essentially executory contracts).
82. Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding patent licenses are executory contracts).
83. James A. Beldner, Intellectual Property Agreements and Bankruptcy: Issues Facing Non-
Debtor Licensors and Licensees, 893 PRACTICING L. INST. PATENTS COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARK &
LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 229, 231 (2007). But see Schuyler M. Moore, Enter-
tainment Bankruptcies: The Copyright Act Meets the Bankruptcy Code, 48 BUS. LAW. 567, 583
(1993) (noting that in the example of television rights, the copyright license should not be executory
under the Countryman test because "the consideration for the license is a fixed advanced payment,"
and therefore no continuing material obligations exist).
84. Lesser, supra note 16, at 581.
85. WARD, supra note 40, § 4:1, at 342.
86. Id. § 4:83.
87. Id. § 4:99, at 528.
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course, can be interpreted as debtor's breach.88 The time period follow-
ing a bankruptcy's commencement and before the trustee's decision to
assume or reject executory contracts is known as the "gap period.,
89
III. CONTRARY OR COOPERATIVE CODE?:
THE STORY OF SECTIONS 365(N) AND 363(F)
A. The Origins of Section 365(n)
Licensee Protections
Legal advances are often made when courts find themselves in the
gray areas of legal uncertainty, such as cases of first impression, and an
unpopular judicial decision may force the legislator's hand. This is the
origin of the licensee protections embodied in section 365(n) of the
Code. 90
1. The Lubrizol Enterprises Case
In 1985 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc,91 a
bankruptcy case wherein a debtor-licensor had licensed to another com-
pany the right to use its patented technology for coating metal.92  In
Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor-licensor rejected the licensing agree-
ment.93  The bankruptcy court approved the rejection,94 but the district
court ruled that the debtor-licensor's decision did not terminate the licen-
see's rights to use the technology under the contract.
95
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the rejection of
an IP licensing agreement terminated all rights of the licensee to use the
debtor-licensor's IP, 96 "despite the 'serious burden' it caused to the licen-
see." 97 In addition, the appellate court suggested that its hands were tied
because Congress failed to provide protections to technology licensees
88. Id.
89. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 266. But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (8th ed.
2004) (defining the "gap period" as "[t]he duration of time between the filing of an involuntary
bankruptcy petition and the entry of the order for relief"). In this Comment, I will use this the term
to refer to this time period in both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcies because intellectual assets
can be sold "free and clear," regardless of the form of proceeding.
90. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 238.
91. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).




96. Id. at 1048.
97. Lesser, supra note 16, at 590 (quoting Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048).
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similar to those given to real-property lessees.98 Without such statutory
protection, the Lubrizol licensee was forced to "share the general hazards
created by § 365 for all business entities dealing with potential bankrupts
in the respects at issue here." 99
Nevertheless, characterizing the resulting circumstances of this IP
licensee as a "serious burden" 100 was an understatement. Under the then-
existing Code, termination of an executory licensing contract left a licen-,
see with nothing but an unsecured claim in bankruptcy. 1°1 This is an un-
favorable position because bankruptcy courts prioritize creditors and pay
them according to their class.102 Secured creditors generally fare better
than unsecured creditors because they are "entitled to be paid to the ex-
tent of the value of the collateral before other creditors."' 1 3 On the other
hand, unsecured creditors are paid a pro rata share of the remaining as-
sets, 1°4 generally constituting mere "cents on the dollar."' 0 5 Thus, char-
acterization as an unsecured creditor carries tremendous significance
with regard to a licensee-creditor's ability to recover from the debtor-
licensor's decision to reject.
In addition to ruling that the licensee lost its right to use intellectual
property, the court deemed the licensee to be an unsecured creditor enti-
tled only to monetary damages, 0 6 despite the fact that IP is a "unique
property right[]."' 7  The loss of irreplaceable property rights falls
heavily on industries that significantly depend on these rights. 08 This
burdensome position is where the Lubrizol court left the IP licensee.10 9
98. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045. Specifically, the court explained:
Congress has plainly provided for the rejection of executory contracts, notwithstanding
the obvious adverse consequences for contracting parties thereby made inevitable.
Awareness by Congress of those consequences is indeed specifically reflected in the spe-
cial treatment accorded to union members under collective bargaining contracts . . . and
to lessees of real property [under] 11 U.S.C. § 365(h). But no comparable special treat-
ment is provided for technology licensees such as Lubrizol.
Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 1048.
100. Id.
101. See VIZY, supra note 12, § 18:9 (discussing Lubrizol).
102. See BAIRD, supra note 6, at 15.
103. Id.; see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 6.
104. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 11.
105. Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11, at 457.
106. Id. at 461 ("Because the licensee relied heavily on this technology in its operations, an
unsecured claim for damages (without the ability to enforce specific performance by the debtor
licensor) was a small consolation.").
107. S. REP. No. 100-505, at 4 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3203.
108. See ViZY, supra note 12, § 18:10; Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11, at 461.
109. VIZY, supra note 12, § 18:9.
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The Lubrizol decision alarmed the technology industry." Unable
to depend on courts to enforce licensing agreements in such situations,
technology companies contemplating future licenses found themselves
forced to make a difficult choice: To secure the ability to use valuable
intellectual assets, they would need either to continue to depend on li-
censing agreements without any assurances against unexpected loss"' or
purchase the IP outright. 12
Each constituted an equally poor solution.113 On the one hand,
businesses must be able to marshal assets and depend on them for future
use. On the other hand, full assignment of the underlying IP is unduly
expensive and thus economically inefficient.114 Because intellectual as-
sets are indivisible, an owner has a financial obligation to fully exploit
such property, by licensing its use to multiple companies, for example,
whereas a licensee can concentrate its efforts on bringing a product to
market.1 5 The difference in cost between a licensing agreement and out-
right sale of the underlying asset can be substantial." 6 Faced with noth-
ing but bad alternatives, many in the technology industry lobbied Con-
gress for relief."7
2. Congress Weighs In
Congress responded quickly. As its name suggests, the Intellectual
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1989 ("IPBPA") 118 fashioned sig-
nificant safeguards for technology licensees facing rejection by a debtor-
licensor in bankruptcy. 1 9 Modeled after existing protections for real-
property lessees under section 365(h), 120 the newly minted section
365(n) 121 provided licensees a choice of two options following a debtor-
licensor's rejection of an executory contract.
122
110. See CLASSEN, supra note 23, at 76. See generally VIZY, supra note 12, § 18:10.
111. See Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11, at 461.





117. See Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11, at 461.
118. The central provision of this Act is codified in § 365(n). Id.
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (2006); see also Lesser, supra note 16, at 590.
120. See BAIRD, supra note 6.
121. According to section 365(n)(1),
(1) [ilfthe trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a licensor of a
right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract may elect-
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such rejection by the trustee
amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee to treat such contact as terminated
by virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by li-
censee with another entity; or
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Under the first option, a licensee may treat the rejection as a termi-
nable breach by the licensor 123 and "bring a claim for damages to the ex-
tent the rejection caused the licensor to fail to meet the licensor's obliga-
tions." 124  Such action, however, forecloses all future use by the licen-
see. 1 25 Alternatively, a licensee can keep the right to use the IP for the
length of the contract and any extensions available thereunder. 126 This
second choice allows a licensee to continue using the intellectual asset,
127
which dramatically shifts power back to the licensee.1 28 Commentators
agree that this is the section's central feature.
1 29
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such con-
tract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific per-
formance of such contract) under such contract and under any agreement supplementary
to such contract, to such intellectual property (including any embodiment of such intel-
lectual property to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law), as such rights
existed immediately before the case commenced, for-
(i) the duration of such contract; and




123. Lesser, supra note 16, at 589 ("Section 365(n) provides that if the trustee rejects an execu-
tory contract for intellectual property, the licensee may ... treat the contract as terminated if such
rejection amounts to a terminable breach.").
124. CLASSEN, supra note 23, at 77.
125. Id.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006); Lesser, supra note 16, at 589-90.
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006).
128. Wickstead, supra note 19. Although a licensee may continue to use the IP, a licensor
need not perform any ancillary duties, such as maintenance or troubleshooting, features that may be
necessary if a licensee seeks continued use for the length of the agreement. Id. Thus, a licensee of
software should only enter a licensing agreement that allows its employees or outside professionals
to troubleshoot and fix the IP if the need arises. Id. For example, a source-code escrow could give
the licensee the ability to troubleshoot if the licensor were ever to go through such a situation. Id.
129. See, e.g., VIZY, supra note 12, § 18:10 (calling the effect of this election the "heart of the
Act"); Warden & MacKay, supra note 81, at 305 (calling it the "essence of section 365(n)"). Al-
though section 365(n) provides some protection to licensees during the gap period, this protection is
quite limited. See II U.S.C. § 365(n)(4) (2006). This section provides the following:
(4) Unless and until the trustee rejects such contract, on the written request of the licensee
the trustee shall-
(A) to the extent provided in such contract or any agreement supplementary to such con-
tract-
(i) perform such contract; or
(ii) provide to the licensee such intellectual property (including any embodiment of such
intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law) held by the
trustee; and
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such contract, or any
agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including such
embodiment), including any right to obtain such intellectual property (or such embodi-
ment) from another entity.
Id. As such, when this Comment subsequently discusses the licensee protections of section 365, it
will be referencing the protections embodied in section 365(n)(1).
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Even so, the second option offers only partial relief.130 While a li-
censee may continue use, all ancillary rights normally subject to specific
performance are statutorily excluded.1 31 Thus, the licensee retains only
an unsecured claim for damages for the loss of these potentially neces-
sary rights. 132  Such ancillary rights include, for example, the
increasingly fundamental right to receive maintenance and troubleshoot-
ing from the licensor.
133
In summary, section 365(n) gives rise to two important observa-
tions.134  First, these protections begin only following rejection by a
debtor-licensor.135 Second, once this statute is triggered, licensees have a
choice of options: they may either terminate or continue the contract.' 
36
B. Section 36369 Sales Free and Clear
Although the connection is not immediately obvious, 137 a second
Code section may either cooperate with, or eviscerate, the protections
available to licensees under section 365(n). As noted previously, trustees
may "sell ... property of the [debtor's] estate.' ' 138 The rights and obliga-
tions of executory contracts become property of the bankruptcy estate
and are subject to such sales. 139 If a transaction is outside the ordinary
course of business, 140 then "[n]otice, hearing and a court order is required
before any use, sale, or license can occur."1 4 1 In most situations, the sale
of IP by a debtor-company would indeed be outside the ordinary course
of business. 42 Under such situations, if a trustee were to sell a debtor's
IP, license agreements with third parties would normally remain intact. 143
130. See id.
131. Wickstead, supra note 19.
132. Id.
133. See Meyer, supra note 17, at 46-47 ("[L]icensees will be concerned with their ability to
obtain assistance from the licensor in fixing defects discovered in the technology... to obtain peri-
odic upgrades and other maintenance services from the licensor ... and to continue enjoying the
technology even if the licensor becomes bankrupt."). Id.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006).
135. See id. As discussed supra in note 129, the pre-rejection protections found in § 365(n)(4)
are too limited to be considered adequate and thus are not addressed.
136. See id
137. 6A WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN ET AL., WEST'S FEDERAL FORMS § 10015, at 213 (4th ed.
2007) ("A superficial glance at sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code may lead one to con-
clude that the two bankruptcy statutes are largely independent of one another.").
138. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).
139. WARD, supra note 40, § 4:14 ("Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code casts a wide net over
the debtor's rights for purposes of defining 'property' that passes to the 'estate' created on the date
of bankruptcy. The broad definition of 'property' includes both proprietary and contractual rights.").
140. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).
141. WARD, supra note 40, § 4:68.
142. Wickstead, supra note 19.
143. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 192.
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Under certain circumstances, however, trustees have a statutory
power to sell assets "free and clear" of all existing property interests.'
44
According to section 363(f), "[t]he trustee may sell property. . . free and
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate,"
but only if at least one of five requirements is met.145 This Comment will
focus on the condition allowing such sales when entities with an interest
in the property give their "consent."
C. Interaction Between Section 365(n) Protections
and Section 363(9 Title-Clearing Sales
Traditionally, advocates and courts have understood section 365(n)
to mean that a licensee's rights are protected in the event that a licensor
sells the underlying IP in bankruptcy. 46 In recent years, however, the
Seventh Circuit decided a pair of cases that calls this understanding into
doubt.
47
1. FutureSource: Opening the Door
In 2002 the Seventh Circuit decided FutureSource L.L. C. v. Reuters
Ltd.,'148 a case involving a debtor-licensor of IP in bankruptcy. 149  The
debtor-licensor, Bridge Information Services, competed with Reuters in
the subscription news market.5 FutureSource, the licensee, had con-
tracted with Bridge to receive "continuously updated, consolidated, rear-
ranged, and reformatted financial-markets data for resale to Future-
Source's customers."' 151 Within two years, however, Bridge sought bank-
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (2006). According to the statute,
[t]he trustee may sell property... free and clear of any interest in such property of an en-
tity other than the estate, only if-
(I) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such in-
terest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than
the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
145. See id
146. Genovese, supra note 6, at 648 ("[T]he general assumption among courts and practitio-
ners has been that the section 365(n) protections would apply in a sale context to protect the licen-
see.").
147. See id.
148. 312 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 2002).
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ruptcy protection. Before Bridge decided to assume or reject the li-
censing agreement, it sold the IP assets used in its data service to
Reuters. 153 Under the sale, Reuters "assum[ed] no contractual or other
obligations" regarding the licensing agreement with FutureSource.
154
Instead, the licensor's obligations were sold separately to another
company called Moneyline Network. 155 FutureSource, the licensee, was
given notice of these title-clearing sales but failed to object to them.
56
The district court granted FutureSource a preliminary injunction to
halt the sale of the debtor-licensor's IP, but the Seventh Circuit re-
versed.'57 Although it did not address licensee protections under section
365(n), the court, in an opinion authored by Judge Posner, held that the
language in section 363(f) stating that "any interest" could be included in
the sale of IP license agreements.158 As for what condition authorized
the section 363(o sale, Judge Posner explained that "one of those condi-
tions is the consent of the interest holder, and lack of objection (provided
there is notice, of course) counts as consent."' 159 For the sake of effi-
ciency, he argued that reading "implied consent" into the Code is neces-
sary to reduce overall transaction costs leading up to these sales.'
60
Curiously, the FutureSource decision did not address the licensee
protections of section 365(n). Instead, the court decided the case on the
lone ground that section 363(f) sales have an expansive title-clearing
force that extinguishes IP licenses.'61
2. Qualitech: New Territory
Unanswered questions lingering after FutureSource seem to have
been answered the following year. 162  In Precision Industries, Inc. v.
Qualitech Steel SBQ, L.L.C. (In re Qualitech Steel Corp. & Qualitech
Steel Holdings Corp.), 63 the Seventh Circuit held, in a case of first im-
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 284.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 287.
158. Id. at 285.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 285-86. See discussion of the merits of the court's efficiency argument infra Part
1V.B.2.
161. See WARD, supra note 40, § 4:70 ("[FutureSource] ... relies on the similarities between a
lease and a license and concludes that a license on arguably copyrightable compilations of financial
data and related software is an interest extinguishable in a § 363(f) 'free and clear' sale.").
162. See id. ("[Qualitech] ... makes clear that, in the case of a lease, the lessee's right to retain
the leasehold ... after the debtor landlord rejects the lease does not prevent the sale of the property
'free and clear' of the lease if the requirements of § 363(f) are met.").
163. 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003).
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pression,' 64 that a debtor-lessor of real estate may sell the underlying
property "free and clear" of encumbrances, despite the lessee protections
of section 365(h). 165 As a real estate case, the legal issues raised did not
directly implicate IP licenses; the court's analysis, however, "may by
extension deny licensees the protections of § 365(n) in the event of an
[IP] asset sale.' 66
The debtor-lessor in this case, Qualitech Steel, ran a steel mill on a
large tract of land and entered into two contracts: a supply agreement and
a ground lease. 67 In exchange for the lease, the lessee, Precision Indus-
tries, constructed an on-site warehouse and agreed to operate it for ten
years in conjunction with Qualitech's business operations. 168 Under the
lease, Precision had "exclusive possession of the warehouse and any im-
provements it installed on the land for the term of the lease,"'169 in addi-
tion to the right to remove such improvements in the event of an early
termination or default. 70 Accordingly, Precision constructed the ware-
house on the property.'
71
Debtor-lessor Qualitech subsequently filed for Chapter 11 and sold
most of its assets, including the real property, at a bankruptcy auction.
72
Precision, which had notice of the section 363(f) sale, never objected.
173
The asset purchaser transferred its interests to a newly-formed corpora-
tion, which assumed the rights of the purchaser and took title to the real
property. 174 The terms of the sale also gave the purchaser the debtor-
landlord's "right to assume and assign executory contracts pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 365.' ' 7  Instead, the purchaser abruptly changed the locks on
the lessee's warehouse. 76 This action sparked the "dispute over whether
Precision's possessory interest in the leased property, pursuant to section
365(h), survived the bankruptcy sale."'
177
164. Id. at 540.
165. Id. at 547 ("[W]e conclude that the terms of section 365(h) do not supersede those of
section 363(f).").
166. Cieri & Labovitz, supra note 14; see also BAIRD, supra note 6 ("The specific rules gov-
erning technology licenses in § 365(n) are analogous to the specific rules governing real property in
§ 365(h).").
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The bankruptcy court ruled for the new purchaser, but the district
court reversed. 178  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision. 179 In this case, the Seventh Circuit finally addressed the
potential conflict between section 363(f) sales and protections afforded
to lessees under section 365(h). 180 The lessee argued that section 365(h)
preserved its leasehold interest, despite the debtor-lessor's sale during the
gap period.
181
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. 182 Instead, the court found no con-
flict between the Code sections;' 83 rather, it reconciled the two sections
by limiting the scope of lessee protections because "nothing in the ex-
press terms of section 365(h) suggest that it applies to any and all events
that threaten the lessee's possessory rights."' 184  Thus, citing Future-
Source, the court held that the section 363(f) language extinguishing
"any interest" upon sale was "sufficiently broad to include Precision's
possessory interest as a lessee."'
85
The Qualitech decision "sent shock waves through the real estate
industry"'186 and caused a collective uproar from bankruptcy practitio-
ners. 87 The case was seen by many as a "substantively flawed decision
completely opposite to the existing precedents."' l8 8  Even more insidi-
ously, the decision "creates an incentive for debtors to accomplish a
stealth rejection" of unwanted interests, thereby profiting the estate from
proceeds of the sale.' 89 Although controversial, these decisions comprise
the current body of federal appellate case law regarding the interaction







184. Id. at 547. In addition, the court found that "adequate protection" under § 363(e) provided
the lessee with sufficient relief from the sale. Id at 547-48. "'Adequate protection' does not neces-
sarily guarantee a lessee's continued possession of the property, but it does demand, in the alterna-
tive, that the lessee be compensated for the value of its leasehold--typically from the proceeds of the
sale." Id. at 548.
185. Id. at 545.
186. John C. Murray, Precision Industries Part 1: Debtor-Lessor's Property May Be Sold
"Free and Clear" of Unexpired Lease, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 10.
187. Genovese, supra note 6, at 641 ("[S]everal commentators have characterized the... case
as a bankruptcy bombshell."). But see Joshua Stein, Is the Sky Really Falling on Leasehold Mort-
gagees?: Ground-Lease Financing After Qualitech, 24 SHOPPING CENTER LEGAL UPDATE 6 (2004),
available at http://www.real-estate-law.com/infoFrame.php?pdf-=Qualitech Case-44.pdf (observing
that the reaction to this case was overblown inasmuch as "Precision lost only because it 'sat on its
rights' under § 363(0").
188. Baxter, supra note 6, at 477.
189. Id.
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two Circuit level cases seem to stand for the proposition that a licensee,
even one who elects to retain use rights after rejection under
§ 365(n)(1)(B), can be forced to take 'adequate protection' for its re-
tained interest that will then be extinguished in a 'free and clear' sale
under § 363(f)."'190
For IP licensees several important questions remain. First, how se-
cure is a technology licensing agreement if the licensor goes into bank-
ruptcy? Second, now that the Seventh Circuit has taken this troubling
position, what can be done to alleviate the problem?
IV. ERRORS BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Legal scholars dispute the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in
Qualitech that the protections of section 365(h), and by analogy section
365(n), are subject to section 363(o sales. 191 Also controversial was the
decision that such sales could be authorized by a lack of response by the
interested licensee. 192 Next, each of these two issues will be examined in
turn.
A. Section 365(n) Licensee Protections
Trump Section 36369 Sales
Although "free and clear" sales generally serve an important func-
tion in bankruptcy by maximizing the value of the estate, such sales give
greater cause for concern when debtor-licensors sell their IP prior to re-
jection. The main concern lies in the timing: Licensees have statutory
protections available, so long as they can survive attempts by the debtor-
licensor to extinguish their property rights before section 365(n) protec-
tions are triggered.
While the IPBPA was enacted to provide relief to IP licensees, the
precise extent of that relief is uncertain. The plain language of section
365(n) only authorizes protection upon rejection: "If the trustee rejects
an executory contract . . . , the licensee ... may elect [one of two op-
tions].' 93
190. WARD, supra note 40, § 4:70, at 467. The language of section 363(e) states that
[o]n request of a person who has an interest in any property that is being used, sold, or
leased, . . . the court must prohibit or condition [it] to the extent necessary to provide
adequate protection .... Broadly speaking, the claimant with the interest in the property
is entitled to have the value of the interest protected from diminution.
HERBERT, supra note 74, § 9.03[D], at 137 (1995); see also II U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006).
191. E.g., Baxter, supra note 6, at 481-85; Genovese, supra note 6, at 641.
192. See infra Part IV.B.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006) (emphasis added). Some commentators have concluded that
the Seventh Circuit misread the statutory language. E.g., Baxter, supra note 6, at 501. Baxter as-
serts that § 363() "clearly subordinates all sales under §§ 363(b) and (c) to the provisions of § 365."
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A close reading of the IPBPA's legislative history, however, indi-
cates that Congress probably intended these protections to apply regard-
less of the debtor's decision to assume or reject the licensing agreement.
According to the Senate report, "[t]his bill is intended to restore confi-
dence in the system of intellectual property licensing, and courts inter-
preting it should be sensitive to the reasonable practices that have and
will evolve among parties seeking to add to the technological and
creative wealth of America." 194 This important language "advises the
bankruptcy courts to recognize agreements that foster the development of
intellectual property, even at the expense of fundamental bankruptcy
policies"' 95-including policies such as maximizing the return to credi-
tors through section 363(f) sales. Notice, too, the primacy given to the
important policy of "add[ing] to the technological and creative wealth of
America."1
96
Here again, lawmakers conveyed the desired effect of this bill:
Congress never anticipated that the presence of executory obliga-
tions in an intellectual property license would subject the licensee to
the risk that, upon bankruptcy of the licensor, the licensee would
lose not only any future affirmative performance required of the li-
censor under the license, but also any right of the licensee to con-
tinue to use the IP as originally agreed in the license agreement. 197
To restate it affirmatively, Congress intended to secure the rights of li-
censees under every conceivable circumstance in a licensor's bank-
ruptcy, even if the licensor had no further obligations to perform under
the contract. 198 And such an impulse makes rational sense: aside from
the passage of time, there is no distinction between the licensee's pre-
carious position before rejection and his or her much-relieved situation
following rejection. Why then would Congress sympathetically grant a
licensee protection on the day after rejection, but deliberately withhold it
the day before?
Recall that the IPBPA was passed in reaction to Lubrizol,199 where
a licensee lost all rights when its debtor-licensor rejected the licensing
Id. Thus, he concludes that title-clearing sales under § 363(f) are "expressly limited by § 365(h)."
Id.
194. S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.
195. Walter Benzija et al., Survey: The Treatment of Intellectual Property Interests in Bank-
ruptcy, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 391,436 (1995).
196. S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.
197. Id. at 3, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3201-02 (emphasis added).
198. See id; see also VIZy, supra note 12, § 18:10 ("The purpose of the [IPBPA was] to en-
courage the licensing of technology by ensuring that licensees receive the benefit of their bargains,
even after their licensors file for bankruptcy.").
199. See Johnson & Giddens, supra note 11, at 461.
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agreement. 200 Using this case as a lens, congressional intent "to restore
confidence in the system' 20 can be viewed broadly or narrowly. Viewed
broadly, Congress could have understood the injustice of Lubrizol to be
the loss of valuable license rights by a nonbankrupt third-party technol-
ogy company. Viewed narrowly, however, lawmakers could have under-
stood the injustice to be the loss of valuable license rights by the same
technology company, but only when a debtor-licensor first rejected the
executory contract. Although the former view is the more plausible,
lawmakers nevertheless expressed themselves statutorily in rigid terms of
66 ,202rejection.
Thus, if bankruptcy judges are to give effect to the manifest inten-
tion of federal policymakers, they should deem outstanding IP licenses to
be "rejected" by the debtor-licensor in the event of a section 363(f) sale.
First, the licensor's decision to sell is substantively a decision to reject
the unfavorable licensing agreement anyway, so such a decision by the
court would merely state the realities of the situation. Moreover, doing
so would ensure that technology companies that fail to realize the sig-
nificance of a title-clearing sale and to make their objection known to the
court would not lose their valuable IP licenses.
If, in fact, jurists are ultimately persuaded that these title-clearing
sales are not bound by section 365(n), then the only protection for licen-
sees against a sale are the bare prerequisites of section 363(f). Thus, it is
necessary to examine whether "failure to object" is sufficient to satisfy
the section 363(f)(2) "consent" requirement-the prong most likely to
cause hardship to an uninformed technology licensee.
B. Implied Consent
As the technical argument goes, if "rejection" never occurs, then
section 365(n)(1) is never implicated.2 °3 Accordingly, licensees must
simply rely on existing safeguards found in section 363(f). These safe-
guards come in the form of required conditions before a debtor-licensor
may sell IP free and clear of existing licensing agreements under section
363(f):
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free
and clear of such interest;
200. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1044 (4th Cir.
1985).
201. S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (2006).
203. See Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, L.L.C. (In re Qualitech Steel Corp. &
Qualitech Steel Holdings Corp.), 327 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2003).
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(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to
be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such prop-
erty;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceed-
ing, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.
These conditions are disjunctive, so any one of the five is sufficient to
authorize a sale.2°5 Subsections (1), (3), (4), and (5) of section 363(f) are
arguably less likely than subsection (2), the consent requirement, to lead
to involuntary transfers of property rights. Of these, one requirement
allows sales when permitted under "applicable nonbankruptcy law.
°20 6
Another describes situations where property is "used to foreclose a lien
out of proceeds where the sale price is sufficient to discharge all
liens., 207 The language of subsection (4) grants judges the power to al-
low sales to resolve an interest in dispute.0 8 Lastly, in subsection (5),
sales are "authorized because the interest can be compelled in law or eq-
uity to take a monetary substitute. 20 9
Section 363(f)(2), however, presents a more challenging question:
Under which situations is the consent requirement satisfied?210 If a li-
censee were to affirmatively agree to the loss of licensing rights by al-
lowing a debtor-licensor to sell the underlying IP, such affirmative con-
sent would easily satisfy the requirement. However,
the controversy centers on the ... sufficiency of so called "implied
consent." In various places, the Bankruptcy Code provides for the
expedited finding of "implied consent" by parties in interest wher-
ever the Code authorizes activities only "after notice and hearing."
This phrase is defined in § 102(1)(B)(i) so as to authorize an act
without an actual hearing if a party with an interest is properly noti-
fied and fails to request a hearing. However, where the Bankruptcy
Code requires actual "consent" [as in section 363(f)(2)], a higher
204. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (emphasis added).
205. 3 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 363.06 (15th ed.
rev. 2006) ("It should be remembered that the language of section 363(f) is in the disjunctive, that is,
that the sale of the interest concerned can occur if any one of the conditions of section 363(f) has
been met.").
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level of assent seems to be required. Despite the structural argu-
ments for requiring some positive manifestation of assent from an
entity before a "free and clear" sale extinguishes that entity's inter-
est, the trend in the recent cases has been toward finding "implied
consent" whenever an entity has notice of the proposed § 363(f) sale
and does not object or insist on adequate protection under
§ 363(e).211
Professor Ward contends that, because section 363(f)(2) calls for "con-
sent," rather than "implied consent," Congress seems to require "a higher
level of assent" than mere inaction by a licensee.
21 2
To date, the only federal appellate court to address this issue has
been the Seventh Circuit, and it has regrettably embraced the rule of
"implied consent" for section 363(f)(2) sales. Yet there are forceful
opinions to the contrary from bankruptcy courts in other circuits. 21 3 For
example, in In re Roberts,214 a Michigan bankruptcy court held that si-
lence is insufficient consent for section 363(f)(2) sales. 21 5 The court re-
lied heavily on the semantic difference between the word "consent" in
section 363(0(2) and the phrase "does not object" in section 363(c)(2). 1 6
That the two formations would follow so closely in the Code "establishes
beyond doubt that these are two separate and distinct concepts. 21 7 Ac-
cording to the court,
[h]ad Congress substituted "does not object" for "consents" in Sec-
tion 363(f)(2), there would be no question that the lienholder had
the obligation to act if it did not want the property to be sold free
and clear of its lien. However, the concept of consent (i.e., to give
assent) imposes no such duty upon the lienholder. To the contrary,
"consent" obligates the trustee to approach the lienholder and secure
the lienholder's assent if the trustee wishes to sell the property free
and clear of the lien.
218
211. Id. at 468 (citations omitted).
212. Id.
213. See In re DeCelis, 349 B.R. 465, 470 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (arguing that the central
holding in FutureSource barred collateral attack ofthe sale order by the licensee and holding implied
consent insufficient); In re Roberts, 249 B.R. 152, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that
implied consent is insufficient because the statutory language says an entity must "consent," rather
than requiring that an entity does not object).
214. 249 B.R. 152 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000).
215. Id. at 153.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 156.
218. Id.
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Unfortunately, such decisions represent a minority view; generally, bank-
ruptcy courts follow the contrary holding in FutureSource: Failure to
object will be understood as consent.219
1. The Policy Implications
of Section 363(f) Consent
Even though the Seventh Circuit has accepted "implied consent"
for section 363(f) sales, there are strong policy arguments in favor of
mandating affirmative consent. First, arguments that transaction costs
are reduced under an implied-consent regime220 presuppose that a sale
should occur. Despite the likelihood that parties who do not care about
losing title will not object to such sales, it is equally important to note
that an absence of responses from interested parties under an affirmative-
consent regime could indicate an equally overwhelming preference to
halt a sale. Besides, the onus to establish affirmative consent should be
on the trustee (or debtor in possession, depending on the circumstances)
who is trying to alter the existing state of affairs by extinguishing possi-
bly valuable interests in IP. As the party who stands to gain monetarily
from such a transaction, the trustee has a financial incentive to secure (or
even purchase, if necessary) affirmative consent from any parties with
property interests.
Second, the failure of an interested party to object to a title-clearing
sale does not necessarily indicate a lack of objection. Despite the fact
that notices are mailed to interested parties, a title-clearing sale could be
held with as little as twenty-days notice. 22' As in the earlier hypothetical
involving our protagonist Squirtech, not all businesses are represented by
counsel or, particularly, counsel with expertise in the nuances of bank-
219. David F. Heroy & Steven A. Domanowski, The Purchase and Sale of Assets in Bank-
ruptcy, 849 PRACTICING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 957, 1000-01
(2003). The majority of courts
have refused to follow the reasoning ofIn re Roberts. Instead, these courts have recog-
nized that ... silence or the failure to object constitutes consent. These courts have rea-
soned[] that to hold otherwise would be to increase the transaction costs of any section
363 sale by requiring anyone who might have an interest in the debtor's assets to execute
a formal written expression of consent.
Id. (citations omitted).
220, See FutureSource L.L.C. v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281,285-86 (7th Cir. 2002).
221. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). Specifically, this rule directs that,
[with exceptions], the clerk, or some other person as the court may direct, shall give the
debtor, the trustee, all creditors and indenture trustees at least 20 days' notice by mail of:
(2) a proposed use, sale, or lease of property of the estate other than in the ordinary
course of business, unless the court for cause shown shortens the time or directs another
method of giving notice ....
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ruptcy law. During certain times of the year, such as the winter holidays,
twenty days is not a meaningful time period to secure counsel and appre-
ciate the full ramifications of a section 363(f) sale. Moreover, unlike the
heightened notice requirements of federal district court requiring service
of process, 222 "free and clear" sale notices need only be mailed to a
manager, officer, or other company agent.223 Thus, especially in larger
companies, the company's "receipt" of mail may occur long before man-
agement is given an opportunity to read and forward it to the legal de-
partment or outside counsel for evaluation and explanation.224 Given
these circumstances, a company's failure to object cannot be understood
as sleeping on its rights, so no equitable justification exists for imposing
the potentially harsh consequences of a title-clearing sale.
Finally, an affirmative-consent requirement is a fairer solution be-
cause no one will be surprised by a loss of rights in a sale without a hear-
ing. Even though a licensee need only object to the sale to protect his or
her rights, 225 the effects of bankruptcy should be minimized so as not to
spill over and do additional financial harm to third-party licensees.
While the sudden loss of licensing rights may have little impact on a
company, such "consequences can be devastating, perhaps leading to the
licensee's own bankruptcy. '226  Although an implied-consent require-
ment may often capture the intentions of interested parties, there is a bet-
ter solution. Even if requiring affirmative consent hints at unnecessary
judicial paternalism, on the whole, such shortcomings can be tolerated in
the pursuit of a more-just legal system.
2. Revisiting the "Efficiency" of Implied Consent
Judge Posner, author of FutureSource,227 grounded his decision on
the efficiency argument that stated implied consent was necessary to re-
duce transaction costs for section 363(f) sales. 228 "It could not be other-
wise; transaction costs would be prohibitive if everyone who might have
an interest in the bankrupt's assets had to execute a formal consent be-
fore they could be sold., 229 In his view, such sales are important because
222. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (2006); see also 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 214 (2005) ("The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service of federal court process upon an individual pur-
suant to the law of the state in which the district court is held.").
223. Wickstead Interview, supra note 19.
224. Id.
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1); see also Stein, supra note 187.
226. VIZY, supra note 12, § 18:10.
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they increase the size of the estate and maximize the return to creditors,
many of whom will ultimately fail to fully recover their debts.
But this view seems to conflict with his recurrent 230 theme that the
law should, above all, maximize societal wealth.231 While Judge
Posner's opinion favors a rule of implied consent,232 efficiency consid-
erations also countenance an interpretation of the Code that limits harm
to nonbankrupt third-parties,233 such as technology licensees. After all,
to quote Judge Posner himself,
[insofar as] bankruptcy... causes not just a transfer of wealth from
shareholders, managers, and some creditors to other creditors but
also the consumption of valuable resources (lawyers' and bankers'
and judges' time, suppliers' expectations, etc.) as well as the reduc-
tions in the efficiency of asset use ... anything that increases the
risk of bankruptcy imposes a social cost.
23 4
To Judge Posner and other law-and-economics theorists, a "social cost"
is one which "diminishes the wealth of society. 235
An implied-consent rule causes very real social costs in terms of
spillover third-party bankruptcies, just as it no doubt saves some debtors
money that would otherwise be spent contacting parties with licensing
rights. Perhaps one day these costs may outweigh the concomitant bene-
fits, but as it stands today, this rule of implied consent may very well be
more efficient. While an efficiency analysis should generally guide
bankruptcy law to maximize the return to creditors, unbridled efficiency
should not be allowed to masquerade as justice in cases where bank-
ruptcy causes catastrophic economic damage to unwitting third parties.
C. Caveat Emptor: A Better Way Forward
There are several solutions to the dilemma facing technology licen-
sees. One clear solution would be a statutory amendment to the Code
230. Judge Richard A. Posner Brief Biological Sketch,
http://home.uchicago.edu/-rposner/biography.html (last visited July 31, 2007). At last count, Judge
Posner has authored "30 books and more than 300 articles and book reviews." Id. Primarily, these
works have "explor[ed] the application of economics to a variety of legal subjects." Id.
231. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 35 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that
under Judge Posner's school of legal thought, the central social good to be furthered by the law is the
maximization of society's total wealth). See generally Judge Richard A. Posner Brief Biological
Sketch, http://home.uchicago.edu/-rposner/biography.html (last visited July 31, 2007) ("[Judge
Posner] urged wealth maximization as a goal of legal and social policy, contributed to the economic
theory of regulation and legislation, and extended the economic analysis of law into fields new to
such analysis, such as family law, primitive law, racial discrimination, jurisprudence, and privacy.").
232. FutureSource, 312 F.3d at 285-86.
233. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 435 (7th ed. 2007).
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 6.
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explicitly subjecting section 363(0 sales to section 365(n) licensee pro-
tections. Another would be for the Ninth Circuit, in particular, to give
full effect to the protections of section 365(n) by deeming any "free and
clear" sales to automatically reject the license immediately prior to sale.
Also, courts could demand "affirmative consent" before authorizing such
sales. Finally, reform may be available through rulemaking at the na-
tional or local level.
But short of such clear, and perhaps unlikely, 236 solutions, bank-
ruptcy courts can still hold purchasers of IP, in "free and clear" consent
sales, accountable to the rights of third-party licensees by using the doc-
trine of caveat emptor2 37 Roughly translated as "let the buyer be-
ware," 238 this doctrine generally states that a purchaser of property takes
title "subject to the defects, liens, and encumbrances of which he has no-
tice or of which he could obtain knowledge under a duty to inform him-
self.
239
Similarly, courts should place the onus on the IP buyer at bank-
ruptcy "free and clear" sales. Potential purchasers of IP should inform
themselves of all encumbrances on the property and the circumstances
leading up to its sale. In cases where a title-clearing sale is authorized by
the implied consent of a licensee who appears to be making productive
use of an IP license, a purchaser should understand that such a sale
would likely constitute an involuntary transfer of rights.24° Whereas
some courts, like the Seventh Circuit, could tolerate this situation on the
theory that transaction costs are kept at a minimum, the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor should act as a powerful counterargument that these pur-
chasers knew, or should have known, ex ante that there was a serious risk
the licensee would challenge the sale.
Even if the debtor-licensor did not forewarn the buyer of these in-
terests, judges should impose these liabilities on the buyer nevertheless.
Accordingly, the buyer would have no ancillary service obligations, but
the licensee could continue use; this system would mirror the protections
236. Jennifer S. Bisk, Software Licenses Through the Looking Glass: Drafting Individually
Negotiated Software Licenses That Protect the Client's Interests in Bankruptcy, 17 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 611, 649 (2007) (predicting that "the amendment of the bank-
ruptcy code is unlikely in the short term").
237. Wickstead, supra note 19. The author would like to thank Mr. Wickstead for suggesting
this doctrine as a possible avenue of thought.
238. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (8th ed. 2004). Caveat emptor is a "doctrine holding that
purchasers buy at their own risk." Id.
239. 50A C.J.S. Judicial Sales § 61 (1997).
240. Of course, sales for which all interested parties gave affirmative consent would remain
unaffected. True consent would, after all, obviate the need for any protection for an uninformed or
unaware licensee.
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provided in section 365(n)(1). At that point, the buyer could then decide
under the terms of the sale what action to take, if any, against the debtor.
Moreover, saddling purchasers with the risk that a licensee's "fail-
ure to object" did not in fact mean "consent" is not unduly burdensome
in this situation because many buyers obtain counsel to conduct due dili-
gence investigations of these assets prior to the sale; otherwise, they
would be stuck with overvalued IP. 241 There is no assurance that licen-
sees, on the other hand, are even aware of the ramifications of this type
of sale.242 Accordingly, this increased knowledge would better position
these purchasers to handle risk. Finally, such application of caveat emp-
tor is not unprecedented: at least one federal district court has applied
this doctrine to purchasers at bankruptcy "free and clear" sales.243
In sum, the application of this doctrine simply provides a fairer and
more equitable way for jurists to balance the rights of an IP licensee vis-
A-vis the rights of a potential IP purchaser.
V. CONCLUSION
We live in an increasingly interconnected society, and people have
found ways to work together like never before. Although businesses do
sometimes fail and seek the relief of bankruptcy, unwitting third parties
need not share in this failure. If the judiciary is to demonstrate any
modicum of sensitivity to IP companies and entrepreneurs "seeking to
add to the technological and creative wealth of America, ' 244 then courts
should not follow the misguided line of cases produced by the Seventh
Circuit. By checking deliberate safeguards and amplifying economic
risks, this circuit seriously threatens the survival of many companies.
Instead, bankruptcy judges must follow Congress's efforts to pro-
tect and honor the rights of licensees. As such, the Ninth Circuit should
break with the Seventh Circuit's recent bankruptcy rulings. Although
more is at stake in this jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit need not succumb
to result-oriented jurisprudence to arrive at this conclusion. Rather, as
the home to a disproportionately large number of licensing transac-
tions,245 this jurisdiction's increased familiarity with the problem should
enable it to look more closely at the issues involved in this conflict of
statutory interpretation, weigh the equities in this type of case, and give
241. Wickstead, supra note 19.
242. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
243. Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 B.R. 251, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(rejecting, under the doctrine of caveat emptor, a purchaser's claim that easements rendered the title
unmarketable in a "free and clear" sale of real estate).
244. S. REP.NO. 100-505, at 9 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.
245. See discussion supra Part I.
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full effect to the protections Congress clearly intended for technology
licensees.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should not allow interpretations of the
Code that casually extinguish the property interests of licensees. Instead,
sales "free and clear" must be made subject to these protections. Such
important sales should follow only affirmative, not implied, consent.
Finally, even if the Ninth Circuit follows the rocky path laid by the Sev-
enth Circuit, it should apply the doctrine of caveat emptor in limited
cases of technology sales following implied consent in order to effectuate
a licensee's inchoate statutory protections. Surely, entrepreneurs who
start and build technology companies like Squirtech embody this techno-
logical and creative wealth. Courts should heed Congress's clear warn-
ing not to fail these individuals.
